Declaratified Care: ITW= 82370 Date:

ARGENTINA

1978 MATERIAL



# Intelligence Information Cable

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| SECRET CITE  |
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| Acquiting DIST :20 April 1978  |
| REPORT CLASS SECRETWNINTEL   |
| COUNTRY: ARGENTINA/BRAZIL  |
| SUBJECT: INCREASED ACTIVITY BY MONTONEROS AND PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY |
| ARMY (ERP)   |
|  |
| SUMMARY: IN MARCH 1978 BOTH THE MONTONEROS AND THE PEOPLE'S          |
| REVOLUTIONARY ARMY (ERP) INCREASED THEIR MILITARY ACTIVITY. THE      |
| MONTONEROS PLAN TO WAGE A PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN DURING THE WORLD CUP   |
| SOCCER MATCHES ACCUSING THE GOVERNMENT OF RULING BY TERROR.          |
| AT PRESENT THERE ARE ABOUT 600 MONTONEROS                            |
| ACTIVISTS INSIDE AND OUTSIDE ARGENTINA. BOTH THE MONTONEROS AND THE  |
| ERP HAVE SUPPORT BASES IN BRAZIL, AND THE ERP HAS PLANS TO ESTABLISH |
| A BASE IN BOLIVIA. END SUMMARY.                                      |
|  |
|  |
|  |
| 2 SINCE FARLY MARCH 1078 THE MONTONEROS HAVE INCREASED THEIR         |

5 MILITARY ACTIVITY THROUGH SMALL-SCALE OPERATIONS, INCLUDING SHOOTINGS
4
3 AND THE PLACEMENT OF PIPE BOMBS. THE ACTS ARE INTENDED TO APPEAR
1 AS SPONTANEOUS POPULAR REACTIONS AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT RATHER THAN AS

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ACTS CARRIED OUT BY THE MONTONEROS.

- THE MONTONEROS PLAN TO INITIATE A PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN DURING THE WORLD CUP SOCCER MATCHES IN ARGENTINA ACCUSING THE MILITARY JUNTA OF RULING BY TERROR. THE PROPAGANDA METHODS TO BE EMPLOYED WILL INCLUDE THE DISTRIBUTION OF POSTERS DEPICTING THE RIVER PLATE STADIUM (WHERE THE MATCHES ARE TO BE HELD) SURROUNDED BY BARBED WIRE AND THE CIRCULATION OF RUMORS ON THE APPEARANCE OF CORPSES AND THE EXIST-ENCE OF CONCENTRATION CAMPS HOLDING THOUSANDS OF PEOPLE. TO DISSEMINATE THE PROPAGANDA. THE MONTONEROS PLAN TO INITIATE CLAN-DESTINE RADIO TRANSMISSIONS.
- THE PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY ARMY (ERP) ALSO RENEWED MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN MARCH 1978. SINCE 11 MARCH 1978. THE ERP HAS BEEN RES-PONSIBLE FOR NINE TERRORIST ACTS IN THE GENERAL CAPITAL AND GREATER THE LOW-LEVEL OF ERP ACTIVITY PRIOR TO MARCH BUENOS AIRES AREA. HAD LED SECURITY FORCES TO CONCLUDE THAT THE ERP WAS NEARLY DESTROYED. THE SECURITY FORCES NOW BELIEVE THAT THE ERP HAS SUCCESSFULLY REOR-GANIZED (AT LEAST IN THE BUENOS AIRES AREA) TO AN EXTENT PERMITTING THEM TO BOTH CARRY OUT ARMED ACTS AND ELUDE THE SECURITY FORCES.
- THE ERP HAS ESTABLISHED A BASE IN BRAZIL WHERE MEMBERS RE-CEIVE INSTRUCTIONS AND DOCUMENTATION. THE ERP IS ATTEMPTING TO ESTABLISH ANOTHER BASE IN BOLIVIA, BUT NOT UNTIL ERP MEMBERS OUTSIDE OF

CENTINA BEGIN RETURNING TO ARGENTINA VIA BOLIVIA WILL THE SECURITY

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|---|---|
|   | FORCES KNOW WHETHER THE ERP HAS BEEN SUCCESSFUL. ERP MEMBERS LIVING IN  |
|   | ARGENTINA HAVE RE-ESTABLISHED CONTACT AMONG THEMSELVES AND MEET ONCE A  |
|   | MONTH TO RECEIVE INSTRUCTIONS, AND THE ERP'S NEWSPAPER.   |
|   | A LIMITED NUMBER OF NEWSPAPERS ARE PRINTED WITH ONE COPY DIS-   |
|   | TRIBUTED TO EACH ACTIVIST FOR PERSONAL USE  |
| , | E025x1  |
|   | 7. THERE ARE CURRENTLY ABOUT 600  |
|   | MONTONEROS BOTH WITHIN AND OUTSIDE ARGENTINA. THIS NUMBER INCLUDES THOSE  |
|   | WHO HAVE SERVED IN A SUPPORT CAPACITY. IN ADDITION THERE ARE SEVERAL  |
|   | HUNDRED SYMPATHIZERS WHO ARE CONSIDERED INCLINED TO BE ACTIVISTS BUT WHO  |
|   | HAVE NOT PARTICIPATED IN VIOLENT MONTONERO ACTIVITIES.  |
|   | DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THE MONTONEROS WILL ENGAGE IN ACTIVITIES, SUCH AS THE   |
|   | PLACEMENT OF BOMBS AT THE STADIUM, DURING THE WORLD CUP SOCCER MATCHES  |
|   | WHICH WOULD PHYSICALLY HARM THE ARGENTINE PEOPLE. INSTEAD, THE  |
| • | MONTONEROS PLAN TO CONCENTRATE ON THE PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN AND TO DRAW ON  |

THE SERVICES OF SYMPATHETIC FOREIGN JOURNALISTS. THEY PLAN TO DIRECT  $_5$  JOURNALISTS TO SITES DEPICTING MISERY AND REPRESSION. THE MONTONEROS  $_4^{\rm M}$  WILL SET OFF BOMBS THROUGHOUT THE CITY BUT ONLY AFTER FIRST ALERTING

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JOURNALISTS TO THE TIME AND PLACE.

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MONTONERO FINANCES HAVE BEEN DAMAGED BY THE RECENT LACK

OF SUCCESS IN EXECUTING RANSOM OPERATIONS. ALTHOUGH THE ERP HAS BEEN ALMOST COMPLETELY DESTROYED, IT STILL RETAINS THE BASIC STRUCTURE TO BECOME POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS. 3

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# Threat Analysis Group office of SECURITY

#### SECRET

## THREAT ASSESSMENT: ARGENTINA

(WORLD CUP SOCCER)

Prepared by: Isabel J. Johnstone 632-2412

May 8, 1978

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EXEMPTION CATEGORY 1 AND 2
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## SUMMARY

Since 1976 the terrorist threat in all areas of Argentina has diminished substantially. The two major terrorist groups in Argentina, the People's Revolutionary Army (ERP) and the Montoneros, have suffered severe losses. Most of their top leaders have been killed, captured, or forced to flee the country. Several small terrorist groups have been completely eliminated. Terrorist membership rolls have been depleted by perhaps as much as 85 percent. Kidnapping as a terrorist tactic has almost completely disappeared due to the lack of personnel and the inability of cells or platoons to coordinate activities. The majority of recent terrorist activities has been directed against soft targets, especially government officials without quards, and business executives. C/GDS declas 12/31/84)

Argentine security officials believe that the terrorists will not disrupt the World Cup through violence but will use the games as an opportunity to gain publicity. There is no intelligence to indicate that international terrorists have attempted to enter Argentina although the Argentine government fears they may try. (%/GDS declas 12/31/84)

Although the view that the games will not be disrupted by violence is based on several intelligence reports and Montonero public statements to this effect, there are also intelligence reports that indicate certain elements of the Montoneros may be planning spectacular acts of violence for the games. Argentine authorities have expressed their apprehension about this group, and have added additional security forces for protection at the World Cup. (%(GDS declas 12/31/84)

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## BACKGROUND

The decline of terrorism in Argentina has been attributed to the successes of the military and police security services, functioning in both combined and individual operations. Before the military took over the government on March 24, 1976, in a bloodless coup, Argentina was on the edge of anarchy with daily kidnappings, murders and public bombings. From 1970 to 1976, approximately 3,000 persons died during political violence in Argentina. The inability of President Isabel Peron to control the terrorists, and the rapidly deteriorating economy led to the military takeover. Since the military took power, it is estimated that about 4,000 guerrillas have been killed. (UNCLAS)

At their peak effectiveness from 1973 to 1976, the ERP and the Montoneros ranked among the most effectively trained, financed and most deadly proficient of their kind in the world. Argentine terrorist successes provided an example for other terrorists all over the world. The recent kidnappings in Western Europe appear patterned after successful Montonero and ERP operations. (UNCLAS)

Besides the political violence that the terrorists brought to Argentina, the two major extremist groups cost the nation scores of millions of dollars and contributed to the economic crisis. Ransoms extracted exceeded more than US \$100 million. Foreign heads of businesses with branches in Buenos Aires abandoned Argentina by the hundreds out of fear. For three years there was no new major foreign investment in Argentina. (%/GDS declas 12/31/83)

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## THE ERP

The ERP, a Marxist-Trotskyite organization, was founded in 1970 by Mario Roberto Santucho. It was considered the best organized, most intelligent and highly motivated of the Argentine terrorist groups, and for several years, Argentine security forces were unable to stop the ERP's wave of urban terrorism. The demise of the ERP began in 1975 when the ERP, deciding the time had come for a shift from urban terrorism to classical rural guerrilla movement, launched an operation in Tucaman. It was a disaster, and the ERP suffered great losses. The organization was further crippled in July 1976 when Santucho was killed by the security forces. What was left of ERP leadership moved abroad. (\$\square\$NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/XGDS-1,2)

The ERP has suffered great losses and until March of this year, their low level of activities had led Argentine security forces to conclude that the ERP was nearly destroyed. In March the ERP renewed military operations and was responsible for nine terrorist acts in and around Buenos Aires leading the Argentine security forces to believe that the ERP has successfully reorganized (at least in Buenos Aires) to an extent permitting them to both carry out armed attacks and elude the security forces. Argentine authorities estimate ERP membership to be approximately 200-275 members, of whom only 20 are considered to be the combat cadre. (%/NOFORN/NO-CONTRACT/XGDS-2)

In 1973, the ERP founded the Revolutionary Coordinating Junta (JCR), composed of Latin American extremist organizations from several Latin American countries with headquarters eventually established in Western Europe. However, wide contacts have since been established with revolutionary groups throughout Latin America. The JCR was never able to become a viable international terrorist group, partly due to the high degree of nationalism of its members. The JCR has suffered as a result of the decline of the ERP, which initially provided most of the funds and logistical support. (\$\frac{1}{2}\NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/XGDS-1,2)

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### THE MONTONEROS

The Montoneros, named after a mounted band of "patriotic irregulars" that roamed Argentina's plains in the mid-nineteenth century, is the largest terrorist organization in Argentina. Its roots can be traced back to 1955 to the Peronist Revolutionary Movement which formed shortly after the fall of Peron in 1955. By the early 1970's, the Montoneros were dedicated to the return of Peronism to power and the establishment of a "socialist fatherland." ever, the Peronist movement that took power in 1973 was a changed movement. During Peron's absence, major polarization had developed between the more moderate and labor-centered old-line Peronists and the younger Peronists who considered themselves "revolutionary." The Montoneros who assumed the position of the military arm of the "revolutionary" young Peronists were soon in conflict with the more numerous moderate elements of the movement. They began to become disenchanted with Juan Peron's conservative policies. A few months after Peron's death in July 1974, the Montoneros went underground, declaring war on the "fascists" who had taken control of the movement. They were declared illegal by Isabel Peron's government in December 1975. (\$\sqrt{NOFORN}/ NOCONTRACT/XGDS-1,2)

By the time of their open break with the Isabel Peron's government, the Montoneros had become an extremely powerful military and political force. Some security elements estimated their strength to be between 7,000 and 10,000 with several thousand sympathizers in the Argentine population. Since March 1976, Argentine police and military have had considerable success against the Montoneros. (%/GDS declas 12/31/83)

The Montoneros are no longer able to carry out intricate kidnappings or assassinations. They have suffered numerous casualties and what is left of their leadership has fled to Europe, Mexico or Brazil. Argentine security forces believe that Montonero explosive technicians

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were sent abroad, presumably to the Middle East. They have a weak logistics and intelligence system, and it is difficult for them to recruit personnel. Their resources are depleted, and they have suffered many major defections, in some cases of high ranking personnel. Many of these defectors are collaborating with Argentine security officials. It is currently estimated that there are 450 to 500 Montonero combatants, of which 150 are outside of Argentina. (NGDS declas 12/31/84)

Due to their heavy losses, the Montoneros have been forced to change their tactics. For the last year and one half they have concentrated on "soft" targets. Their acts are sponsored by small groups of three to four people and are directed against business executives, management officials and security officials, when they can. Because of their present military weakness, the Montoneros have increased their efforts in the political/labor sector, and are trying to forge an identification with dissatisfied workers and capitalize on the harsh economic situation. (1/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/XGDS-2)

The most serious threat from the Montoneros today is their use of remote controlled explosives which can be planted in a car beside a road. These devices can be detonated when the targetted person or vehicle is next to the car. The radio controlled devices have coded sending and receiving units which prevent the scanners from detecting the frequency that the detonated device is operating on. The Montoneros have also begun to use an improved plastique explosive. (%/GDS declas 12/31/83)

Unlike the ERP which was composed of a hard core of professional, organized terrorists with a minimum of popular support, the Montoneros are a more loosely organized group with wider support. The ERP was the more doctrinairely Marxist and often criticized the Montoneros as being opportunists without

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a definable ideology. Nevertheless, it is the Montoneros who survive as the main viable terrorist group in Argentina, due chiefly to its size and support from Peronist sympathizers. The Montoneros have recently renewed their identification with Peronist left-wing politicians in exile and have increasingly used the name the "Montonero-Peronist Movement." Because of the continued support the Montoneros receive from many Argentines, the movement will not be easy to defeat. (\$\square\$NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/XGDS-1,2)

## SECURITY OF AMERICANS IN ARGENTINA

The Embassy evaluation of the security problem is that the situation has been greatly improved. Restrictions have been eased for travel of official USG personnel outside of Buenos Aires, and U.S. businessmen are being told that, provided they practice good security precautions, they can return to Buenos Aires. (CGDS declas 12/31/84)

The Montoneros may choose not to target U.S. officials because they feel that the U.S. human rights position favors the terrorists as opposed to the Argentine government, and consequently any terrorist act against U.S. personnel would tarnish their image and be counterproductive. Argentine officials note that the records obtained from raids on terrorist intelligence centers reflect no updating of lists concerning USG personnel since 1975 and cite this as reflective of a lack of interest in attacking U.S. or other diplomatic personnel. It should be noted, however, that even in 1975, when the ERP and Montoneros were at their peak strength and there were numerous opportunities to attack USG personnel in Buenos Aires, no such attempts were made, although the Embassy was aware of some surveillance of USG persons. At that time, the U.S. had not espoused its position on human rights which apparently at the present time terrorists feel is favorable to their movement. (%/GDS declas .12/31/83)

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Although the prevalent opinion is that U.S. personnel are not targets of terrorist activists, there is no guarantee that if this is true it will remain true indefinitely. With freer targetting by the cells and the lack of central leadership, a group may choose any easy target for attack without weighing whether or not this activity would be politically counterproductive. Also, they may come to feel that the U.S. human rights policy, which heretofore may have been in their favor, is in reality not helping their cause. Their instinctive distrust and animosity toward the United States as "capitalist exploiter" may outweigh other considerations. (NGDS declas 12/31/84)

### WORLD CUP SECURITY

At this time, based on all available information, another Munich type terrorist incident is not expected; however, given the security environment in-Argentina of the last five years, neither Argentine security services can guarantee that an attempt will not be made during Argentine security officials have stated believe the terrorists will not initiate any action that would be harmful to the spectators or disrupt the games, such as placing bombs in a stadium, but will use the games as an opportunity to spread their propaganda to the world. On the other hand, they fear that an independent military unit not under control of the main Montonero political unit may be planning an attack. (S

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the Montoneros have now agreed upon their policy for activity during the World Cup. Their policy would be based on passive demonstrations aimed at provoking Argentine security forces into violent countermeasures. The Montoneros will endeavor to infiltrate numbers of their supporters

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| of ruling by  | terror.    | They plan    | to circulate                             | rumors       |                |          |
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| They plan to  | initiate   | clandestin   | e radio trans                            | missions     |                |          |
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| .Argentine se | curity for | ces believ   | e that the te                            | rroriete     |                |          |
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As the World Cup approaches, in Montonero tactics. Since early March the Montoneros have increased their military operations, including shootings and the placement of pipe bombs. They are making an effort to make these acts appear spontaneous, thus appearing not as acts carried out by the Montoneros, but as actions perpetuated against the government by a genuinely disenchanted public.

Despite public statements by Montonero leaders that they will not disrupt the games through violence and the belief terrorists will not harm spectators or players.

concern that the terrorists could be planning a spectacle that may be violent.

the Montoneros are concentrating on the assassination of principal government figures and plan to kill at least four before the World Cup.

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Argentine officials are concerned that violence may come from a Montonero military action unit which is not under the control of the main political unit. According to Argentine officials, the Montoneros have two special combat troop units in the country of 4-5 members each: trained abroad, considered to be high calibre, extremely dangerous, and the best cadre the Montoneros have in Argentina. are not directly connected with the national organization and take their orders from abroad. Argentine security services are reportedly extremely anxious to apprehend this group prior to the World Cup. (%/GDS declas . 12/31/86)

Also a source of concern are possible plans of Argentine terrorists in Uruguay and Brazil for terrorist acts during the Cup. In December 1977, the Uruguyan government captured eight Montoneros who they claimed were involved with plans to launch terrorist operations during the Cup. Montoneros

was planning to mount at least two spectacular operations in each of the cities where the games were to be held; the objective would be to attract world attention to their organization and to demonstrate to the world that the. Montonero movement is not defunct.

terrorist groups including the Black September Organization and the Red Sun (sic), are planning a wave

of terrorist activity during the Cup; however, the prospects of the Black September Organization being active in Latin America, especially linking up with the Montoneros, is highly unlikely. Red Sun is not a known terrorist group.

The West German Embassy was reported to be concerned that German terrorists would travel to Argentina to commit a terrorist act. They have no specific information but it is a source of considerable concern on

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their part. West German security officials recently travelled to Argentina checking the stadium and residence sites. Although there have been recent reports that members of the German Red Army Faction were in Central and South America, these rumors appear so far to be completely unfounded. There is little likelihood of cooperation between the Montoneros and the Red Army Faction. (%GDS declas 12/31/84)

The Argentines have created a special unit within the army command, headed by General Juan Alberto Pita, to provide increased protection during the World Cup. Five thousand soldiers have reportedly been detailed to this assignment. There will be increased controls on foreigners entering Argentina. It is likely that security will be tight where the players are residing. They have set up a special communications unit to prevent interruptions of the television broadcasting facility. (NOFORN/GDS declas 12/31/84)

The main indicators that another Munich incident will probably not occur in Argentina are the increased security measures instituted by the Argentine security forces for the games, the limited capabilities of the Argentine terrorists, lack of any intelligence that international terrorists have entered Argentina, and intelligence indicating they do not plan to commit violent terrorist acts. (%/GDS declas 12/31/84)

It is conceivable, but unlikely, that a Montonero cell, especially the Montonero military foreign directed branch, would attempt to target a prominent American whose presence is widely publicized. It is also possible that an American visitor could be unintentionally involved as a result of a terrorist attack on an Argentine target. It would seem more likely that the presence of a foreign dignitary of the stature of Dr. Kissinger would provoke an incident designed to discredit the Argentine government and emphasize the alleged abuse of human rights in Argentina. Argentine security officials can be expected to be especially concerned for the safety of distinguished foreign visitors, and this should provide an extra measure of security. (<del>LOU)</del>

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IS A COOPERATIVE EFFORT BY THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES OF ARGENTINA. PARAGUAY, URUGUAY, CHILE, BOLIVIA, PERU AND ECUADOR TO COUNTER TERRORISM AND SUBVERSION.) REPRESENTATIVES OF WEST GERMAN, FRENCH AND BRITISH INTELLIGENCE SERVICES HAD VISITED THE CONDOR ORGANIZATION SECRETARIAT IN BUENOS AIRES DURING THE MONTH OF SEPTEMBER 1977 IN ORDER TO DISCUSS METHODS FOR ES-TABLISHMENT OF AN ANTI-SUBVERSIVE ORGANIZATION SIMILAR TO CONDOR. WERE ALSO INTERESTED IN ALL THE MANAGEMENT, ADMINISTRATIVE AND TECHNICAL ASPECTS RELATED TO CONDOR. THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE REPRESENTATIVES HAD EXPLAINED THAT THE TERRORIST/ SUBVERSIVE THREAT HAD REACHED SUCH DANGEROUS LEVELS IN EUROPE THAT THEY BELIEVED IT BEST IF THEY POOLED THEIR INTELLIGENCE RESOURCES IN A COOPERATIVE ORGANIZATION SUCH AS CONDOR. THEY EMPHASIZED, HOWEVER, THAT IF SUCH AN ORGANIZATION WERE ESTABLISHED. ALL THEIR OPERATIONS AGAINST SUBVERSIVES WOULD BE CLOSELY COORDINATED SO THAT THE SERVICE OF ONE COUNTRY WOULD NOT OPERATE UNILATERALLY IN ANOTHER COUNTRY.

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| COMMENT:   | }  |
| Γ          | THERE IS NO INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO CONFIRM THE REPORTE   |
| VISIT OF   | THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE FRENCH INTELLIGENCE SERVICE TO   |
|            | , AND THERE IS NO KNOWLEDGE OF ANY FRENCH INTENTION TO FOR |
|            | TYPE ORGANIZATION WITH THE BRITISH OR WEST GERMANS. IT IS  |
| POSSIBLE,  | HOWEVER, INASMUCH AS THIS TYPE OF ORGANIZATION WOULD BE O  |
| INTEREST 3 | TO THE FRENCH EXTERNAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (SDECE).)      |
|            |  |
|            |  |
|            | 1  |
|            |  |
|            |  |
| REPORT CLA | ASS S E C R E T - WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE    |
|            | ND METHODS INVOLVED  |
| SOURCES AN |  |

| SECRET | -[ |  |
|--------|----|--|
|        | _  |  |

## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505 Cage: IDX= 82970 Date:

Quice Anglatian

WARNING NOTICE SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

3 0 MAY 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Terence A. Todman

Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs

FOIA(b)(3) - 50 USC 3024(i)(1) -Intelligence Sources and Methods

Ambassador Heyward Isham

Director. Office for Combatting Terrorism

Mr. William C. Bowdler · The Director of Intelligence and Research

Senior Duty Officer State/Sy/Command Center

James Bumpus Chief, Argentine Desk Department of State

John McMahon Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT

: Possible Bombing of Argentine "Casa Rosada"

by Unidentified Terrorist Group

plan for a 120mm mortar attack to be carried out by an unidentified group on the "Casa Rosada" (Government House) in Buenos Aires on 27 May 1978. The time of the attack is unknown.

3. The plan calls for four couples to carry out the mission from four separate locations where one mortar each FOIA(b)(3) - 50 USC 3024(i)(1) -Intelligence Sources and Methods

# . WARNING NOTICE SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

will be emplaced and provided with one round each to be fired simultaneously at the Casa Rosada. The firing locations will be located in two zones: Zone A, the area between Bernardo de Hirigoyen and Defensa and 25 de Mayo and Venezuela; and Zone B, the area between Carlos Pellegrini and Reconquista and 25 de Mayo and Corrientes. The exact location of the firing points had not been determined when the plan was written (25 February 1978) but the plan calls for them not to be closer than 650 meters nor farther than 1000 meters from the target, though the plan states that 750 meters and 550 meters will be acceptable. In each case the firing points will be located in buildings not more than eight stories and not less than five stories high.

- 4. Each of the four couples to carry out the operation will be composed of a man and a woman. Reconnaissance, casing, photography and logistics will have been conducted separately in advance by other teams, including a "military measurements expert." The material used is expected to arrive in Argentina by ship. People involved will be using alias Argentine documents, except that in some cases they will have entered Argentina in true name. The first phase of the operation (casing and reconnaissance) was to have begun on 16 April. Exfiltration for escape of the last operatives in Argentina is to be by 10 June 1978.
- 5. The mortars are to be fixed so that they can be fired automatically by a timing device. This device will be fixed magnetically to the mortars, and will consist of a clock or watch which will activate the mortars' firing pin. The timing device will be battery powered. The reason the mortars are to be fired automatically is to allow the teams who set them up to leave the area before the mortars are fired. The mortars are to be set up and affixed with the timing devices 30 minutes before they are set to fire.
- 6. The plan, which is signed "Carlos", was sent under a covering letter to "Companero Secretario General de Grifa, Gavona, Italia" and is said to be one of 20 copies.

  Comment: "Grifa" probably is identical with an Italian leftist group, CRIFA (Commissione di Relazione Internazionale delle Federazione Anarchiche Commission for International Relations of Anarchist Federations), which has its headquarters in Savona, near Genoa.)

|   | SENSITIVE | WARNING NOTICE<br>INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED |
|---|-----------|---|
|   |           | , ,   |
|   | *         | Raymond A. Warren<br>for John McMahon                       |
| - |           |   |

FOIA(b)(3) - 50 USC 3024(i)(1) - Intelligence Sources and Methods -

## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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WARNING NOTICE

SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs

Ambassador Heyward Isham Director, Office for Combatting Terrorism

Senior Duty Officer State/Sy/Command Center

Jim Bumpus Chief, Argentine Desk Department of State

: John McMahon . FROM

Deputy Director for Operations

: Possible Bombing of Argentine "Casa Rosada" by Unidentified Terrorist Group SUBJECT

È025x1

plan for a 120 MM mortar attack to be carried out by an unidentified group on the "Casa Rosada" (Government house) in Buenos Aires on 27 May 1978. Time unknown.

Plan calls for four couples to carry out mission from four separate locations where one mortar each will be emplaced and provided with one round each to be fired simultaneously at the Casa Rosada. The firing locations will be located in two zones; zone "A: with is the area between Bernardo de Hirigoyen and Defensa and 25 de Mayo and Venezuela; and zone "B" which. is between Carlos Pellegrini and Reconquista and 25 de Mayo and Corrientes. The exact location of the firing points had not been determined when the plan was written (25 February 78) but the

> Declassified Caze: ITX= 52970 Date:


### WARNING NOTICE SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

plan calls for these to be not closer than 650 meters nor farther than 1000 meters from the target, though the plan states that 750 meters and 550 meters will be acceptable. In each case the firing points will be located in buildings not more than eight stories and not less than five stories high.

- 4. The operation will be carried out by four couples, each formed by a man and a woman. Reconnaisance, casing, photography and logistics will have been conducted separately in advance by other teams, including a "military measurements expert". The material used is expected to arrive in Argentina by ship. People involved will be using alias Argentine documents except that in, some cases they will have entered Argentina in true name. The first phase of the operation (casing; reconnaissance) was to have begun 16 April. Exfiltration for "escape" of the last operatives in Argentina is to be by 10 June 78.
- 5. The mortars are to be fixed so that they can be fired automatically by a timing device. This device will be fixed magnetically to the mortars, and will consist of a clock or watch which will activate the mortars' firing pin. The timing device will be battery powered. The reason the mortars are to be fired automatically is to allow the teams who set them up to leave the area before the mortars are fired. The mortars are to be set up and affixed with the timing devices 30 minutes before they are set to fire.
- 6. Plan, which is signed "Carlos" was sent under covering letter to "Companero Secretario General de Grifa, Gavona, Italia" and is said to be one of 20 copies.

FOIA(b)(3) - 50 USC 3024(i)(1) -Intelligence Sources and Methods

John McMahon



Declassified Case: ITX= 52370 Date: 0-23-2013

Use of Soviet Weapons by Argentine Terrorists

F025v

the explosive projectiles used by to 24 June were Soviet-designed "RPG-7" antitank armorpiercing grenades fired from either an "RPG-7" or an "RPG-7" in which this weapon was used, including three attacks against government installations. In each instance, the parked about 200 to 300 meters from the target.

The first attack was against the headquarters of the military factories. The grenade exploded against a pole in front of the factories and caused little damage. In the second attack, directed against the Government House (Casa impact)

a Soviet-made weapon. The third attack reportedly took place at the Argentine Naval Mechanics School

Not only is this the first known instance of the use of this weapon by terrorist groups in Argentina, it is also the first reported use of any Soviet-manufactured weapons by ally recovered by the authorities.

Montoneros were responsible for the attacks. They feel that the weapons may have been obtained from elements of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as a result of discussions in 1977 between Mario Firmenich, a Montonero leader, and PLO leader Yassir Arafat. (SECRET

FOIAID; (3) - 50 Usc 3024(4) (1) - inselitorate Spaces and Methods

INCOMING TELEGRAM.

PAGE 61 9221 947 ACTION INR-18

6221047

INFO OCT-81 PM-85 ARA-18 MCT-82 SY-85 /833 W P 8221827 AUG 78 EH JCS INFO RUEAMCC/CMC CC WASHINGTON DC CNO VASHINGTON DC CSA WASHINGTON DC C 1 4 SECSTATE WASHINGTON DO NSA WASH DO P #718587 AHG TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHINGTONDC/DS-6A// INFO HO BEAF WASHING/XOXXV/ DISCINCSO DUARRY HETS CT CDR 193RD INF BDE FT AMADOR CZ COMNAVINTOOM WASHDO CINCLANT FLEET NORFOLK VA RU LYVGA/USCOMSOLANT PQIA(b) (3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and GAINED ENTRANCE TO THE VACANT APARTMENT ON SECTION 1 OF 2 SUBJ: THIS IS IR 1. COUNTRY: ARGENTINA (AR) 2. REPORT NUMBER: 3. TITLE: (U) SECURITY-EXPLOSION RILLS DAUGHTER OF NAVY CHIEF OF STAFF (U) 4. PROJECT NUMBER: N/A 5. DATE OF INFORMATION: 788881, 788882 6. DATE OF REPORT: 788882 7. DATE AND PLACE OF ACQUISITION: 788881, 788882, BUENOS AIRES 8. REFERENCES: ASSESSMENT 18. ORIGINATOR: 11. REQUEST EVALUATION: ONIT 12. PREPARING OFFICER: C APPROVING AUTHORITY: 14. SOURCE: A. MEDIA-"LA NACION" 788881 B.

HINSTARI E

2. (U) SOURCE C. THE BUENOS AIRES HERALD IN FRONT-PAGE HEADLINES, REPORTED THE DAY AFTER THE EX-PLOSION THAT TWO OTHER PEOPLE BESIDES VADM LAMBRUSCHINI'S DAUGHTER HAD BEEN KILLED. WITH AT LEAST TEN OTHERS WOUNDED IN ONE OF THE WORST TERRORIST BOMB ATTACKS EVER MADE IN BUENOS AIRES

3. (U) ACCORDING TO THE HERALD, THE EXPLOSIVE DEVICE WENT OFF IN A VACANT BEDDOOM OF THE BUILDING TO THE RIGHT OF AND ONE FLOOR BELOW THAT OF THE LAMBRUSCHINI APARTMENT. THE BONB WAS ALLEGEDLY PLACED ON THE CEIDING OF THE EMPTY SECOND FLOOR APARTHENT NUMBERED PACHECO DE MELO 1957 LOCATED IN THE BARRIO HORTE SECTION OF BUENOS AIRES.

4. (U) THE BOMB WHEN IT EXPLODED TORE INTO THE BEDROOM OF PAULA LAMBRUSCHINI IN HER PARENTS' THIRD FLOOR APARTMENT IN THE ADJACENT BUILDING. CONTINUING NEWSPAPER COMMENTS REPORTED THAT THE BOMB WAS PROBABLY PLACED BY TWO YOUNG MEN WHO MONDAY EVENING BY CLAIMING TO BE POLICEMEN LOOKING FOR EVIDENCE OF DRUGS USED BY THE FORMER OCCUPANTS.

5. (U) THE HERALD WENT FURTHER STATING THAT AN ARMY COMMUNIQUE ISSUED ON THE EVENING OF 1 AUGUST 1978 AND SIGNED BY CORP COMMANDER GEN. GUILLERMO SUAREZ-MASON CHARGED THAT "ORGANIZATIONS AND COUNTRIES WHICH CALL THEM-SELVES DEFENDERS OF HUMAN RIGHTS HAVE ONCE MORE FAILER TO RAISE THEIR VOICES FOR THESE INNOCENT VICTIMS SINCE THEY DO NOT BELONG TO THE SECTOR THEY (THESE ORGANIZATIONS AND COUNTRIES) ARE DEFENDING". COMMENTS. 🔲 🖎 AS YET, NO TERRORIST ORGANIZATION HAS TAKEN CREDIT FOR THE BOMBING. THERE IS A GOOD POSSIBILITY THAT NONE WILL, SINCE NO RALLYING CRY OR POPULARITY CAN BE GAINED IN ARGENTINA BY KILLING AN INNOCENT CHILD, AND AN OLD NOMAN

TERRORIST ACTS SUCH AS THIS SERVE TO PLAY INTO THE HANDS OF THE HARD-LINERS AMONG THE SECURITY FORCES WHO CAN EXPECT TO USE IT AS AN EXAMPLE OF UNY STRINGENT SECURITY MEASURES MUST BE MAINTAINED. AS EXEMPLIFIED BY THE PREVIOUS COMMENTS MADE BY GEN. SURREZ-MASON (A NOTED HARO-LINER) SUCH TERRORIST ACTS CAN NOT HELP BUT BE USED BY ARGENTINE OFFICIALS AS AN EXAMPLE OF THE LACK OF UNDERSTANDING U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS

ASUNCION, PARAGUAY, 788881 C. MEDIA-"BUENOS AIRES

OF BUENOS AIRES HAS RESULTED IN THE DEATH OF THE DAUGHTER OF NAVY CHIEF OF STAFF. VADM ARMANDO L'AM-

16. (U) SUMMARY: A BOMB EXPLOSION IN A RESIDENTIAL AREA

22. (U) DETAILS: LOCAL RADIO BROADCASTS CONFIRM PRESS REPORTS AND REPORT THAT AN EXPLOSION IN AN APARTHENT BUILDING IN THE HORTHERN SECTION OF BUENOS AIRES HAS RESULTED IN NUMEROUS INJURIES AND EATALITIES. INCLUDING THE DAUGHTER OF ARGENTINE HAVY CHIEF OF STAFF, VADH LAMBRUSCHINI, WHOSE FAMILY RESIDED IN THE BUILDING. ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS. THE EXPLOSION OCCURRED AT 8448Z, ON 788881. THE FEDERAL POLICE CHIEF, GEN. REHE OJEDA, AND NAVY CINC ADMIRAL EMILIO MASSERA, INSPECTED THE SITE SHORTLY AFTER THE EARLY A.M. EXPLOSION. SECURITY IN THE AREA IS EXTREMELY TIGHT, REPORTS SAY, BECAUSE THE EXPLOSION RENDERED THE STRUCTURE PRECARIOUSLY

15. SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS: DIRC-NO

BRUSCHINI, HEDIA REPORTS.

HERALD" 788882

# Department of State

INCOMING TELEGRAN

PAGE Ø1 0221042 ACTION INR-10 INFO OCT-01 PM-05 ARA-10 MCT-02 SY-05 /033 W -060379 0221137 /70 P 022103Z AUG 78 FM JCS INFO RUEAMCC/CMC CC WASHINGTON DC . CNO WASHINGTON DC CSA WASHINGTON DC CI SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC NSA, WASH DC P Ø2 218587 FOTA/b) (3) 10 HSC 424 - DTA, NRO and NG TO INFO HO USAF WASHDC/XOXXW/ USCINCSO QUARRY HTS CZ CDR 193RD INF BDE FT AMADOR CZ COMMAVINTCOM WASHDC

CONFIDENTIAL SECTIO 2 OF 2

CINCLANT, FLEET NORFOLK VA

SITUATION IN ARGENTINA. IT CAN REASONABLY BE EXPECTED THAT EMBASSY PERSONNEL VILL BE ASKED WHO WAS WORRIED ABOUT PROTECTING THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF VICE ADMIRAL LAMBRUSCHINI'S DAUGHTER.

THERE HAS BEEN SOME SPECULATION AS TO THE ACTUAL CAUSE OF THE EXPLOSION. THERE WERE INITIAL RUMORS BEING PASSED. WHILE ATTENDING VADM LAMBRUSCHIN

WHILE "ATTENDING VADM LAMBRUSCHIT DAUGHTER'S WAKE, THAT THE BLAST MAY HAVE BEEN CAUSED BY A GAS EXPLOSION. THIS INFORMATION HAS NOT BEEN CONFIRMED BY ANYTHING BUT RUMOR. AN EXAMINATION OF THE PHOTOS, ALONG WITH INFORMATION MADE AVAILABLE THROUGH OFFICIAL CHANNELS WOULD INDICATE THAT THE BLAST WAS CAUSED BY THE INTRODUCTION OF AN EXPLOSIVE DEVICE INTO THE VACANT APARTMENT IMMEDIATELY ADJACENT TO LAMBRUSCHINI'S. THE LOCATION OF THE PRINCIPLE BLAST WOULD INDICATE THAT THE ACCIDENTAL GAS EXPLOSION THEORY IS IMPROBABLE, AND THAT THE EXPLOSION WAS INTENDED TO KILL LAMBRUSCHINI. ON 2 AUGUST 1978, AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES SENT AN IMMEDIATE MESSAGE TO SECSTATE WASH, DC REQUESTING THAT A STATE DEPARTMENT SPONESMAN MAKE A STATEMENT CONCERNING THE BOMBING IN ORDER FOR THE USG TO GO ON RECORD AS OPPOSING TERRORIST AS WELL AS GOVERNMENT ACTIONS WHICH OFFEND OUR HUMAN RIGHTS POSTIION.

THIS MSG COORD W AMEMBASSY. GDS 84

EOT

# Department of State

# INCOMING TELEGRAM

| PAGE B1 112153Z  | 5695 .            | . 1121532  |
|--|-------------------|--|
| ACTION INR-10  INFO OCT-81 ARA-10 PH-05 HCT-02 /828 W  |                   | MAS TOLD THAT MONTONEROS HAD USED A MONTONERO G-78<br>GRENADE WHEN ATTACKING THE SUPERIOR TECHNICAL SCHOOL (                 |
| R 1120152 AUG 78   |                   | 19 JULY 1978. IT HAD BEEN PREVIOUSLY REPORTED THAT AN RPG-7 ROCKET GRENADE HAD BEEN USED IN THE ATTACK.                      |
| FM JCS<br>INFO RUEANCC/CHC CC WASHINGTON DC  |                   | SOURCE INDICATED THAT IT WAS UNUSUAL THAT TERRORISTS USED A G-78 GRENADE SINCE IT WAS AN OLD MODEL AND HAD                   |
| CNO WASHINGTON DC  |                   | NOT BEEN USED BY THE TERRORISTS FOR A LONG TIME.  3, 4G)  A G-70 WARHEAD AND AN LG-22-MP                                     |
| C I A  |                   | LAUNCHER WHICH SOURCE B HAD FOR IDENTIFICATION PUR-  |
| SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC NSA WASH DC   |                   | · POSES. THE G-70 SYSTEM HAS A WARHEAD WHICH RESEMBLES   |
| R 111652Z AUG 78 FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USON424 -   | DIA, NRO          | and NGA  |
| TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC//OS-GAN  |                   | PAGE D4 RUESBAAD418 CONFIDENTIAL   |
| INFO USCINCSO QUARRY HTS CZ  | · .               | AN 81MM MORTAR SHELL IN SIZE, SHAPE AND CONFIGURATION.   |
| 24COHPW/IN HOWARD AFB CZ   |                   | <ul> <li>IT 15 FIN STABILIZED IN FLIGHT. THE LAUNCHER IS<br/>IDENTIFIED AS AN LG-22 MP. BOTH WARHEAD AND LAUNCHER</li> </ul> |
| COMMAVINTCOM ALEX VA<br>USCOMSQLANT  |                   | ARE FABRICATED ILLEGALLY BY GUERRILLA GROUPS IN ARGEN-<br>TINA. THE LG-22-MP LAUNCHER IS APPROXIMATELY THREE                 |
| CINCLANTFL T HORFOLK VA  | . ,               | FEET LONG AND CONSTRUCTED OF LIGHT METAL. A PISTOL   |
| HQ USAF WASHDC//XOXXW//  |                   | GRIP/TRIGGER UNIT IS LOCATED ABOUT MIOWAY DOWN THE<br>LAUNCHER TUBE. LAUNCHER IS CHARGED USING THE SAME TYPE                 |
| OF 2 DENTINE SECTION LOF 2   | ×.                |  |
| SUBJ: THIS IS IR NO.   |                   | BOLT APPARATUS AS FOUND IN A TYPICAL SHM SUB-MACHINEG<br>A 16-GAUGE SHOTGUN SKELL IS USED AS THE WEAPONS IGNITI              |
| 1. COUNTRY: ARGENTINA (AR)   | 1                 | DEVICE.  |
| 2. REPORT NUMBER:  |                   | 4. TO ACCORDING TO SOURCE B, THE G-70 HAS A RANGE OF APPROXIMATELY 280 METERS UNDER FAVORABLE CONDITIONS.                    |
| G-78 GRENADE USED IN ATTACK AGAINST ARGENTINE ARMY   |                   | SOURCE STATED FURTHER THAT THE ATTACK OIL THE TECHNICAL  |
| TECHNICAL SCHOOL   |                   | SCHOOL WAS HADE FROM A DISTANCE OF APPROXIMATELY 250 METERS. PHOTOS OF THE DAMAGE INFLICTED OF                               |
|  |                   | THE TECHNICAL SCHOOL. THE GREWAGE STRUCK AND EXPLODED BETWEEN THE WINDOWS OF WHAT APPEARED, TO BE THE THIRD                  |
| PAGE 02 RUESBAA0418 6 6 N F + D C - N T + R C  | ٠.                | · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·  |
| 4. PROJECT NUMBER: N/A<br>5. DATE OF INFORMATION: 780801   | •                 | PAGE 05 RUESBAA0418 CONFIDENTIAL   |
| 6. DATE OF REPORT: 788809<br>7. DATE AND PLACE OF ACQUISITION: 788801, BUENOS AIRES                                |                   | AND FOURTH FLOOR. A SMALL HOLE WAS EVIDENT AT THE POIN<br>OF IMPACT BUT THE GRENADE DID NOT PENETRATE THE SIDE               |
| ARGENTINA .  |                   | OF THE BUILDING. WINCOWS WERE BROKEN AND SLIGHT CAMAGE   |
| 8. REFERENCES:<br>9. ASSESSMENT:   |                   | WAS CAUSED INSIDE THE BUILDING BY CONCUSSION. NO ONE WAS WOUNDED.  |
| 1B. ORIGINATOR:  | •                 | 5. SOURCE B STATED THAT THE G-70 HAD BEEN REPLACED<br>BY THE G-40 GREHADE WHICH HE DESCRIBED AS MORE MODERN                  |
| 11. REQUEST EVALUATION:  |                   | WITH A RANGE OF APPROXIMATELY 400 METERS. THE EXPLO-   |
| 12. PREPARING OFFICER: 13. APPROVING AUTHORITY:  |                   | SIVE IN THE WARHEAD OF THE G-40 WAS DESCRIBED AS A MIXTURE OF EXOGENO (EXOGENE) AND COMPOSITION C2. A NEV                    |
|  |                   | LAUNCHER HAS ALSO BEEN FABRICATED FOR USE WITH THE   |
| B. SOURCE:   |                   | NEW G-40. SOURCE ESTIMATED THAT AS MANY AS 15 TO 20  |
| 15. SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:  16. SUMMARY: TO THIS REPORT PROVIDES INFORMATION WHICH                                  |                   | EOT  |
| UPDATES PREVIOUS IRAND INDICATES THAT A  | 1                 | •  |
| MONTONERO G-78 RIFLE LAUNCHED GRENADE WAS THE WEAPON USED<br>BY TERRORISTS IN AN ATTACK AGAINST THE ARGENTINE ARMY |                   |  |
|  |                   |  |
|  | EO25x1<br>FOIA(b) | (3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA, NRO and NGA  |
| PAGE 83 RUESBAAB418 CONFIDENTIAL SUPERIOR TECHNICAL SCHOOL ON 19 JULY 1978 AND NOT A RPG-7                         | 7 .               |  |
| ROCKET/GRENADE AS PREVIOUSLY REPORTED.   | /                 |  |
| 22. DETAILS: 0 ON 780801.  |                   |  |
| DISCUSS TYPE OF GRENADE LAUNCHERS BEING USED BY TERRORIST  |                   |  |
| <u> </u>   |                   |  |
| [ _ <del></del>  |                   |  |
| 2 The INDIE VICITING SOURCE AT ARMY HEADQUARTERS   |                   |  |

# Department of State

# INCOMING TELEGRAM

PAGE Ø1 112153Z ACTION INR-1Ø 5696

INFO OCT-01 ARA-10 PM-05 MCT-02 /028 W
R 112016Z AUG 78
FM JCS
INFO RUEAMCC/CMC CC WASHINGTON DC
CNO WASHINGTON DC
CSA WASHINGTON DC
CI A
SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC
NSA WASH DC
NSA WASH DC
NSA WASH DC
TO RUEAMCS/CIA WASHDC//DS-6A//

FOIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 - DIA; NRO and NG

FM DENEKJCS/DIA WASHDC//DS-6A//
INFO USCINCSO QUARRY HTS CZ
CDR 193RD INF BDE FT AMADOR CZ
24COMPW/IN HOWARD AFB CZ
COMMAVINTCOM ALEX VA
USCOMSOLANT
CINCLANTEL T NORFOLK VA
HQ USAF WASHDC//XOXXW//

SECTION 2 OF 2

NEW TYPE LAUNCHERS HAVE BEEN MADE THUS FAR. WHEN ASKED HOW MANY GRENADES HAD BEEN MADE HE SAID MANY (MUCHO) EXACT AMOUNT UNKNOWN.

COMMENTS: THE FACT THAT A G-70 GRENADE WAS USED AGAINST THE TECHNICAL SCHOOL WOULD INDICATE THAT THE REASON FOR THE ATTACK WAS PROBABLY FOR HARRASSMENT AS INDICATED IN REFERENCED IR. THE G-40 AND RG-7'S WERE PROBABLY HELD BACK TO USE ON MORE IMPORTANT TARGETS.

2. THE FACT THAT THE TERRORIST GROUPS HAVE AN ESTIMATED 15/20 NEW MODEL GRENADE LAUNCHERS AND AN UNDETERMINED NUMBER OF GRENADES AS WELL AS THE POSSIBLE IS MORE RFO-7'S LOCATED IN-COUNTRY AS REPORTED IN REFERENCED IR WOULD INDICATE THAT THE TERRORISTS STILL HAVE THE MEANS AT THEIR DISPOSAL TO HARRASS, DAMAGE AND EVEN DESTROY GOVERNMENT BUILDINGS, VEHICLES AND PERSONNEL.

THIS MSG COORD W/AMEMBASSY.

GOS-84

EOT

# CONFIDENTIAL Pepartment of State

# INCOMING TEL EGRAM

PAGE Ø1 3003171 ACTION INR-18 INFO OCT-81 ARA-11 MCT-82 PM-85 AF-18 EUR-12 10-14 P 2913457 DEC 78 OR HOTOHINSON 22 HT INFO RUEAMCC/CMC CC WASHINGTON DC CNO MASHINGTON DO C 1 A SECSTATE WASHINGTON DO DO HOME APP R 2911452 DEC TO RUFKJCS/DIA VASHDC//DS-6A// INFO USCINCSO QUARRY HTS CZ//SCJ2-AD// NO USAF VASHDC//DS1// HO ACSI DA VASHDO COMNAVINTOOM ALEXANDRIA VA FQIA(b)(3) - 10 USC 424 CDR 193D INF BOE FT AMADOR CZ DIA: NRO and NGA 24COMPV HOWARD AFB CZ//IN// 1ST SOW/USAFSOS HURLBURT FLD FL O C N T I A L NOFORN SUBJ: THIS IS IR NO. 1. (U) COUNTRY: ARGENTINA (AR) (U) REPORT NUMBER: (U) TITLE: TERRORISH THE ARGENTINE EXPERIENCE AND TRAINING CAMP FOR INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM IN ANGOLA (U) PROJECT NUMBER: N/A (U) DATE OF INFORMATION: 781205 (U) DATE OF REPORT: 781228 (U) DATE AND PLACE OF ACQUISITION: 781285, BUENOS AIRES, ARGENTINA (U) REFERENCE: (U) ASSESSMENT: (U) CRIGINATOR: At) REQUEST EVALUATION: 12. (U) PREPARING OFFICER: (U) APPROVING AUTHORITY: (U) SOURCE: (U) SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS: NOFORN TO PROTECT SOURCE AND METHODS INVOLVED. 16. - CONTINUE SUMMARY: THE FOLLOWING REPORT FORWARDS INFORMATION ON PREVAILING VIEWS OF THE ARGENTINE MILITARY SEGMENT OF THE POPULATION CONCERNING ARGENTINA'S EXPERIENCE WITH AND RESPONSE-TO TERRORISM. -- OF MORE IMPACT IS REPORT OF AN. INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST TRAINING CAMP IN ANGOLA. IT COULD BE THE FIRST OF ITS KIND.

REFERRING TO ARGENTINE'S PAST EXPERIENCE WITH TERRORISM SOURCE STATED THAT IT HAD BEEN AN UNFORTUNATE CHAPTER IN THE COUNTRY'S HISTORY BUT ONE WHICH WOULD NOT REPEAT ITSELF. PRESENT GOA LEADERS HAVE ASSURED THAT CONDITIONS SUCH AS THOSE WHICH PREVAILED THREE TO FOUR YEARS AGO, AND WHICH MADE THE COUNTRY RIPE FOR INSTABILITY AND SOCIAL UNREST WOULD NOT RECUR. ONE CAN NOW SEE THE SAME THINKING TAKING PLACE IN BRAZIL. PARAGUAY AND URUGUAY WHERE THOSE COUNTRIES' LEADERSHIP, AS IN ARGENTINA, MAINTAIN VIGILANCE OF SOCIAL VALUES AND TAKE EFFORTS AT PRESERVING LAW AND ORDER. IF TERRORISM IS TO BE CURBED. IT WILL REQUIRE FIRM AND POSITIVE ACTIONS BY GOVERNMENTS. THE TERRORISTS' BASE CAN GNLY BE ERODED BY THE AUTHORITIES . THRU COUNTERACTING TACTICS AND GAINING LOCAL POPULATION SUPPORT.

SUCH A THING OCCURRED SOME TWO YEARS AGO IN TUCHMAN PROVINCE. GOVERNMENT TROOPS PRETENDED TO BE TERRORISTS; THEY DRESSED AND ACTED AS SUCH. THEN, WHEN PROPERLY UNIFORMED AND IDENTIFIED TROOPS OF THE GOVERNMENT QUESTIONED THE PEOPLE IN TOWNS AND VILLAGES ON TERRORISTS AND THEIR SUPPORT BASE, THE GOVERNMENT TROOPS WERE IN A POSITION TO KNOW WHO WAS COOPERATING WITH GOA OR SUPPORTING THE TERRORISTS. UNMASKING OF THOSE GIVING ALD TO ENEMIES OF AUTHORITIES PAID WELL IN GAINING SUPPORT FROM LARGE SEMENENT OF POPULATION WHICH FROM THEN ON REALIZED THE ELEMENT OF TRUTH IS ESSENTIAL WHEN DEALING WITH THE GOVERNMENT. OF COURSE. IN SUCH SITUATIONS MANY ERRORS IN JUDGEMENT ARE -COMMITTED WHICH CANNOT LATER BE REVERSED OR CORRECTED. THE GOA REALIZED IT IS ESSENTIAL AT ALL TIMES TO RESTRICT THOSE WENT TEND TO EXTRALIMIT THEMSELVES OR ACT IRRESPONSIBILY. ARGENTINA'S VIGILANCE FROM THEN ON HAS PAID OFF EXTREMELY WELL . LOOK AT THE MUNDIAL (WORLD'S SOCCER CHAMPIONSHIP THAT ARGENTINA WON IN JUNE 1978 AND WHICH, AS SOURCE OF NATIONAL PRIDE, HAD EFFECT OF UNITING ARGENTINES THIS YEAR). EXTENSIVE CLOSE COOPERATION TOOK PLACE BETWEEN GOA AND OTHER MATIONS FOR AND DURING THE MUNDIAL. FOR EXAMPLE, KEPT GOA ADVISED OF TRAVEL BY MEMBERS OF TERRORIST GROUPS TO AND FROM EUROPE. ARGENTINA'S SECURITY MEASURES WERE SUCCESSFUL WHEN, FOR EXAMPLE. TWO WEEKS PRIOR TO THE CHAMPIONSHIP SOME FIFTEEN TERRORISTS MERE TRACKED TO AN AREA OF BUENOS AIRES CALLED BOULDGNE. WHERE. IN A SHOOTING WITH POLICE, FIVE DIED AND THE REST APPREHENDED. ONCE TERRORIST ACTIVITY IN ARGENTINA WAS BROKEN BY THE GOVERNMENT. THE OUTLANS SEEKED ASYLUM IN EUROPE, CUBA, AND ELSEWHERE. SOURCE CONTINUED SAYING ANGOLA HAS BECOME A SIGNIFICANT TERRORIST TRAINING CENTER OF THE WORLD. AL FATAH, RED BRIGADE. BADER MEINHOF, AND OTHER SIMILAR ORGANIZATIONS' MEMBERS ARE RECEIVING THERE TRAINING FROM CUBAN CADRES WHO ARE ALOED BY ARGENTINES. THEN QUERIED SOURCE ON CONTINGENT OF ARGENTINES AIDING CUBANS IN TERRORIST TRAINING CAMP. SOURCE RESPONDED THAT ALTHOUGH HE DOES NOT KNOW HOW MANY ARE INVOLVED. THE G-2 (INTELLIGENCE SECTION) OF THE ARGAF HAS EXACT NUMBER.

COMMENT. WAS STATING THE PREVAILING VIEWS OF THE MILITARY IN ARGENTINA CONCERNING TERRORISM AND GOA MEASURES TO CONTAIN IT. TO MAKE UP FOR WHAT IN HIS NARRATION SEEMED TO BE EXTREME MEASURES BY GOVERNMENT IN DEALING WITH TERRORISTS SOURCE STATED. "WE HAD TO DO IT AND CONTAIN IT SOMEHOW, SINCE IT WAS GANGSTERIMS. 'A LA ELLIOT NESS' AND IT WAS GETTING OUT OF HAND." OF MORE INTEREST TO WAS THE INFORMATION GIVEN BY SOURCE OF A TERRORIST TRAINING CAMP IN ANGOLA. INSTANCE OF SUCH INFORMATION BEING REPORTED: HOREOVER, IT IS PARTICULARLY SIGNIFICANT TO NOTE SOME ARGENTINES. ACCORDING TO SOURCE, ARE AIDING IN THE TRAINING GIVEN THERE. WILL ATTEMPT TO GAIN FURTHER INFORMATION ON THE SUBJECT IN FUTURE MEETINGS

DECL/REVW ON 28" DEC 84.

FAT .

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# UNCLASSIFIED Department of State

INCOMING TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 ACTION ARA-15 SANTO 06535 1721102

O R 172100Z NOV 78

FM AMEMBASSY SANTO DOMINGO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6851

INFO AMEMBASSY PORT AU PRINCE

AMEMBASSY CARACAS

USCINCSO OUARY HTS CZ

COMNAYFORCARIB ROOSEYELT ROADS PR

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UNCLAS SANTO DOMINGO 6535

E.O. 11652: N/A TAGS: PINS, AFPS, ASEC, DR SUBJECT: KIDNAPPING AT ARGENTINE EMBASSY

- 1. DOMINICAN AIR FORCE PRIVATE, IDENTIFIED AS ALFREDO GONZALEZ MATEO, SEIZED FEMALE SECRETARY AT ARGENTINE EMBASSY AT NOON NOV.

  17. ORIGINALLY, KIDNAPPER DEMANDED RD 100,000 RANSOM, SAFE CONDUCT TO MEXICO OR URUGUAY FOR RELEASE OF VICTIM, 25-YEAR OLD DOMINICAN NATIONAL CAROLINA CURIEL, AND MEDIATING INTERVENTIOOF PARTIDO REVOLUCIONARIO DOMINICANO (PRD) LEADERS AND LISTIN DIARIO EDITOR RAFAEL HERRERA.
- 2. LATTER REFUSED TO INVOLVE THEMSELVES AND AT MID-AFTERNOON KIDNAPPER TOLD PRD DEPUTY HATUEY DE CAMPS, WHO WAS AT SCENE, THAT HE WAS WITHDRAWING ALL ORIGINAL DEMANDS AND WANTED ONLY SAFE CONDUCT TO VENEZUELA. AT 1700 HOURS, AUTHORITIES REPORTED THAT THEY HAD DISARMED KIDNAPPER WHO IS NOW IN MILITARY CUSTODY. SECRETARY WAS RELEASED UNHARMED.

Declassified | Case: ITX= 52970 Date: | |0-25-2018

CONFIDENTIAL

November 17

C1973

TO:

Ambassador Quainton

Brion!

Thisassador Quarinton

FROM:

John E. Karkashian

SUBJECT:

Non-Munitions List Exports to Argentina

You called my attention to the preparation of a Department response to E-Systems, Inc., the manufacturers of the communications equipment which was denied to Argentina last year on human rights reasons. M/CT supported the sale at the time on anti-terrorist grounds. We discovered in the present case that EB already had sent to Christopher an action memo dated October 19, 1978 (attached) covering a series of proposed sales to Argentina, of which the subject E-Systems equipment was one item. The EB action officer said M/CT clearance was not sought because he was unaware of our interest. I registered our interest and he was appropriately chagrined especially when I pointed out that EB could have profited from M/CT's support on this issue.

I subsequently called John Spiegel to register M/CT's position on the subject which still had not been decided by Christopher (although many of the other sale items had been decided). At Spiegel's suggestion I drafted the attached memorandum.

Also, there is another action memo in preparation by EB (also attached) which includes another E-Systems sale to a large of the sale. I have registered our interest in and support that sale. EB will incorporate our views and clear with us.

Attachments:

GDST .

M/CT:JEKarkashian:nwh



# DEPARTMENT OF STATE

# ACTION MEMORANDUM

SIS

## CONFIDENTIAL

November 16, 1978

TO:

D ~ Mr. Christopher

FROM:

M/CT - John E. Karkashian (Acting)

SUBJECT:

Addendum to Action Memorandum of October 19, 1978 "Non-Munitions List Exports to Argentina

I would like to submit M/CT's recommendation that you approve the item listed on page 2: "a new computerized vehicular dispatch and control system for the police in Rosario." Whatever its shortcomings, the Argentine government does face a serious terrorist problem and the subject system represents a reasonable means of facilitating the ability of the local authorities to deal inter alia with that threat.

Clearance: EB/ITP/EWT: D. Fried W Info: ARA/ECA: J. Bumpas S/P: J. Walker M/CT:JEKarkashian:nwh HA: E.O. Jones

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